I
t has been said that you learn more from your mistakes than from your successes. That's certainly true for me, although for a while I was convinced it simply meant that I make more mistakes than not. Later, I decided I wasn't nearly that bad, and earlier I must have been...mistaken.
Best of all is when you can learn from someone else's mistakes-most of the win for none of the price. So let's do a test case: What did engineers and computer scientists learn about product development when the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded? What did you resolve to do better after the Hubble space telescope and Mars Climate Orbiter errors?
Hint 1: In the set of all possible appropriate answers to these questions, this one is not a member: "I ignored those accidents; after all, I'm not a {mechani-cal/civil/aeronautical} engineer."
Hint 2: Challenger's demise stemmed from a horrible sequence of errors in design and judgment by engineers and NASA management; the Hubble's early problems began with a design error coupled with inadequate testing; the Mars Climate Orbiter's navigation failed due to a disconnect between using English and metric units of measurement.
In all three of these cases-and the others mentioned here-there is plenty of learning to be had for anyone doing design in any field.
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING
We have a handicap in applying the methods of science to the craft of engineering. A main tenet of science is repeatability of experiments. You conjure up an experiment in your lab, then you publish your results and methods. I repeat your experiment, and I get your results too. Or maybe I don't, in which case the ensuing detective work will educate at least one of us, and we'll both benefit from it.
Engineering is more like medical practice. We learn a lot from large populations, but we may or may not have a reliable control for any given design or experiment. For example, there is only one Golden Gate Bridge. We can't build it twice to show how much better our way is than the best known "control" method. Besides, the control bridge would detract from the appearance of the Golden Gate Bridge and confuse motorists, not to mention doubling the cost of construction.
There are some fundamental difficulties in even trying to replicate a large-scale engineering effort while changing only one aspect to determine which way was better. It takes so long to complete large engineering projects like dams, buildings, or spacecraft that the tools and technologies will have changed substantially by the time a second attempt could be made.
There are limits to applying canonical hypothesis-and-control science to engineering. The folks who pay for these things also won't let us test them to destruction-the only way to be really sure the safety margins are what we think they are.
THE HUMAN FACTOR
All the more reason why it is imperative to look for commonalities in these engineering disasters. The period of highest learning in engineering is just after a major accident such as a plane crash, a bridge collapse, or a power grid failure.
As Henry Petroski put it in the title of his book, "to engineer is human" (To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Successful Design, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1985) . We all make mistakes, but we must learn from them and resolve never to make the same one twice.
Diving-saves
Petroski didn't intend to give us a "get out of jail free" card, though. Mistakes occur when a design team is pushing the envelope hard: They may lack information-and may know they lack it-but overriding concerns make some particular test seem a risk worth taking. That's why we have test pilots.
In Failure Is Not an Option (Berkley Books, Penguin Putnam, New York, 2000) , Gene Kranz offers a stirring account of why and how this kind of testing was undertaken during the Near Misses: Murphy's Law Is Wrong
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We must learn from our mistakes and never make the same one twice.
A t R a n d o m
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo space efforts in the 1960s. For those of us old enough to remember those glorious triumphs, Kranz's book is also a startling behind-the-scenes look at the divingsaves behind nearly every one of those missions, not just the infamous Apollo 13 mishap.
Lucky catches
Then there are the kinds of mistakes that make you cringe every time you think about them, even years laterespecially if they are your own.
For example, I once designed a floating-point square-root hardware unit for a computer, using the nonrestoring radix-4 algorithm. The unit calculated the exponents and mantissas of the result separately, using a procedure that delivered two result mantissa bits per clock cycle. When it had generated all of the bits, a rounding bit helped decide whether the mantissa was correct or needed to be incremented.
My hardware worked great, except for one minor thing: If the mantissa was all 1s, the mantissa should have reverted to all 0s when that last increment was performed, sending a carryout to the exponent calculation. Guess what happens if you forget to include that carryout in the exponent calculation? The square root of most numbers is calculated exactly correctly, and the square root of any perfect power of 2 will be exactly half of the correct result.
I've read that bridges are designed with an order-of-magnitude safety margin over the weight of their expected traffic, but airplane wings carry a safety margin of only 1.5 times. After a week of apocalyptic visions of bent airplane wings, I determined that no machines with my broken square rooter had actually shipped yet, and we fixed all of the machines in production. I'm still cringing right now, 15 years after the fact.
Quest for perfection
Is it too much to ask that engineers create products without design errors? Yes and no: It's not too much to ask, but it's way too much to expect. Design engineers must aim for perfection as a normal part of their jobs. In addition to anticipating the nominal ways their product will be used, engineers must also anticipate the "corner cases" in which only their extra diligence will stave off disaster.
So yes, engineers should strive for perfection. But they must never assume that their product will achieve it, and neither should their management.
Experienced engineers know, or should assume, that no matter how hard they work and no matter how diligent they are, their product is likely to include errors.
Designers must do two seemingly contradictory things at the same time: They must design for perfection, and they must design as though errors are inevitable. And they must do the second without compromising the first.
NORMAL ACCIDENTS
If design errors are inevitable, it follows that engineered systems are at risk of malfunctioning. When I first wrote the previous sentence, it said "constant risk of malfunctioning," but that's not quite true. What really happens is that well-engineered systems that are operating in nominal conditions are generally at very low risk of major malfunction. But a striking pattern in failed systems is that a major malfunction is much more likely when those systems are operating under unusual circumstances.
The Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear reactor catastrophes both began when their operators placed those systems into stressful test modes. Sequences of failed valves, operator errors (while under incredible pressure and fear for their lives), and questionable human interface designs of gauges led to complete system breakdowns.
Are such accidents inevitable? That's not a trivial question to ask, whether caused by design errors, inappropriate assumptions, operator errors, or bad luck. And most engineering curricula, if they deal with engineering failures at all, treat them as, "What happens if the engineers goof? Really Bad Things. So don't goof. And there's nothing we can do about those operators." (I'm not picking on academia here; industry is often even worse.)
But that advice is both too simplistic and too idealistic. Yes, humans do make mistakes, and yes, we need to continue discovering ways to both prevent and mitigate the effects of those mistakes. But there is much more to this story-patterns usually underlie failures of complex engineered systems, and knowing what those patterns are is the first step in preventing them.
Coupling and interactions
Charles Perrow, a sociologist at Yale, observed important patterns in his studies of system failures, beginning with nuclear power plants, but later including airplane crashes, chemical plant accidents, maritime collisions, dam collapses, and so on. In Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1999), Perrow argues that we can characterize large systems by their degree of coupling and their degree of interactions.
Systems composed of independent, clearly distinguishable activities with few feedback loops have loose coupling. An automobile assembly line might qualify as loosely coupled: As the chassis proceeds down the line, the various parts are added one after another, until the completed vehicle emerges at the far end. If need be, the assembly line can be stopped, which may be expensive but should not be especially hazardous.
Nuclear power plants, on the other hand, have very tight coupling-there is tremendous latent energy inside the Engineers must never assume that their product will achieve perfection.
opted for a redundant second O-ring at each joint, "just in case." It doesn't seem as though a second O-ring could hurt anything, right? It did, though, and there's a phrase to describe how-normalization of deviance. Looking back with near-perfect hindsight, it's easy to see that the charred O-rings were nature's way of screaming that the design wasn't good enough. Nature was ignored, however, because it became routine to expect some charring of the O-rings. After all, the second O-ring was doing its job. The system hadn't failed, had it?
In essence, if you get away with something once, twice, a few times, it's not illogical to stop thanking your lucky stars and start thinking that the original requirements might have been a little too strict. Nobody has perfect knowledge in an engineering endeavor, and you learn as you go. The trick is to always distinguish between true learning and rationalizations like the normalization of deviance.
JUDGMENT IS KEY-YOURS
Human judgment is the key, both at design time and while resolving a realtime crisis in an engineered system. Education and training matter, and the ability to keep your cool while those all around you are losing theirs is paramount (even Rudyard Kipling had a contribution to make to understanding technology disasters).
But nothing can replace having a deep understanding of the overall system, its principles, its organization, and the way its various subsystems interact and function. Kranz makes this point about most of the Apollo missions, but one in particular, Apollo 12, stands out.
About 36 seconds after launch, Apollo 12 was struck by lightning, and the resulting electrical overload scrambled nearly every system on board, from navigation to communications. Only the guidance computer at the booster itself was spared. That system kept the spacecraft accelerating in the right direction, but the crew was now flying blind. 
Designing for the user
I've already adjured you to design for the end user, who may be nontechnical and untrained. In my experience, the average automobile driver satisfies that definition nicely.
Engineers dutifully design redundancy into automobiles so that losing the antilock brake controller module doesn't leave the brakes completely inoperative. Then they design the engine controller so that if it fails, the vehicle can still limp home. For extra credit, they try to make sure the redundant systems kick in as needed, automatically and as quietly as possible, without unnecessarily alarming the driver.
The insidious outcome of this plan is to present a technological system to users who do not know how far they are from the system's safety limits. The system is reconfiguring itself in real time, without ensuring that the user knows and understands the implications of this process.
Normalizing deviance
This problem is not limited to untrained nontechnical people. In The Challenger Launch Decision (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996), Diane Vaughan cited this factor as being a major contributor to the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. The original solid rocket booster design was borrowed from a military rocket, which needed rocket motor assemblies with an O-ring at each joint. Because the Shuttle was man-rated, the solid rocket engineers pressure vessel, and only careful management of the cooling system and the reactor rods keeps the entire system running properly. If something goes wrong with the cooling system, the operators have a very short time to figure out what happened and to take corrective action before the overheated core begins to damage itself. This urgency limits the operators' options-possibly to the null set, in the case of Chernobyl.
It is much easier to understand a linear, decomposable system than an interactive system in which everything affects everything else. It is particularly important to understand what is happening when things have begun to go awry in a real-time high-energy system. Modern engineered systems are too complex already without wiring surprises into the possible interactions between myriad onboard systems. A pilot who is struggling with an engine should not also have to consider whether the in-flight movie is running smoothly.
MURPHY'S LAW IS WRONG
According to Murphy's law, "If things can go wrong, they will go wrong." But as James Chiles points out in Inviting Disasters: Lessons From the Edge of Technology (HarperBusiness, New York, 2001), Murphy's law is clearly incorrect.
When the Challenger exploded, the problem was quickly traced to the Orings in the solid rocket boosters. Why? Because those O-rings were already under suspicion due to charring and hot-gas "blow-by" in half of the previous 25 shuttle missions. Murphy's law implies those earlier flights should have blown up, but the lesson embedded in those near misses went unheeded.
NASA says there were even hints during the Mars Climate Orbiter flight that something was wrong, described as "Navigation anomalies observed during cruise phase not adequately pursued to determine cause" (http://www.nasa. gov/newsinfo/mpiat_report_1.pdf). Perkin Elmer ignored several indications that something was wrong with Near misses are nature's way of telling us something's wrong, and we'd better fix it fast.
A t R a n d o m
Fortunately, John Aaron, a mission controller, had once witnessed a test in which a technician had accidentally disconnected the power supply, resulting in a similar scrambled system. Being the validation hero that he was, Aaron did not shrug his shoulders and say, "What the heck was that?" Instead, he traced the scrambling to an obscure switch. When Apollo 12 ran into trouble, Aaron had only seconds to analyze the situation and recall this previous incident, and by doing so he single-handedly saved the mission. Engineers can have the right stuff, too.
Distorted judgment
It is important to realize that our own usually reliable judgment can be suspect sometimes. Major emotional upsets can prevent us from thinking clearly, for instance. Imagine trying to diagnose the Three Mile Island accident, standing very near the reactor vessel, knowing that some major system indicators were pointing to an imminent breach of the containment building that could endanger not just you, but your family, your neighbors, and pretty much everybody you know.
Schedule pressure is a classic source of judgmental distortion. People can make very bad decisions under schedule pressures. It's easy to see how this feels: Play a game of speed chess, and notice how much worse your choices become. People need time and correct information to make good judgments, engineers included.
Managerial manipulations
Management judgment matters too. They may know things about overall strategy, upcoming changes in policy, or company relationships that they can't tell you about or don't convey well. So you can't kick the managers out of the room during a crisis, much as you may want to.
Engineers know the technology, where it may fail, and what will happen if it does, and they must be willing to stand their ground when necessary. The combined judgment of management and engineering will eventually determine what to do, so both camps must be heard. Managers must remember that putting too much pressure on engineers can cause them to begin to doubt their own technical judgment. Engineers must remember that it isn't always possible to make decisions strictly on technical grounds.
If you're an engineer caught up in one of these situations, there are some classic ploys to watch out for: Does your boss know you're stupid? "I want you, Mr. Validator, to officially bless the product launch for next Monday." "But we're not finished testing it yet. I can't do that." "This has been the schedule all along. Are you saying you are not competent to do your work to your own schedule or that your team is not competent to do their jobs?"
We go with or without you-you might as well get on board.
"We're launching with or without your signature, so it really doesn't matter very much if you sign." They're lying, of course. If it didn't matter, they wouldn't be leaning on you so hard to get you to sign.
If they're pestering you to sign off, it means they want you to agree that the risk is within acceptable boundaries. They're trying to bias your judgment toward the outcome they like, and they are saddling you with the risk judgment of whether that's an okay thing to do. Rest assured that if things go south later, the fingers you see pointing at you will be attached to their hands.
Be reasonable-see it MY way.
This is best exemplified by the Challenger launch decision meeting, in which an exasperated NASA manager asked the Morton-Thiokol booster engineers to "take off their engineering hats and put on their management hats."
The ship is in the harbor.
"Come on, everyone knows that to launch the product, it's necessary to shoot all the engineers, otherwise they'll tweak forever. Okay, you have reservations, but while a ship docked in a harbor is completely safe, that's not what ships are for." "Yeah, well, they're not supposed to sink like stones, either, and that's what will happen if you launch."
If you have any integrity, be prepared to kick managerial-ploy manipulators out of your office, get your best technical lieutenants together, and make your judgments properly. If necessary, watch the videotape of the Challenger to set the right tone for these deliberations. If you don't have any integrity, please don't do engineering or validation for a living. (I'm trying to refrain from offering alternative occupations here, obvious though some of them may be-like politics or sales.) 
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